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Over the last decade, governments and private sectors worldwide have 
put considerable effort into the commercialization of Remotely Piloted Vehicles 
(RPV) (also known as Unmanned Aircraft Systems [UAS], Unmanned Aerial 
Systems [UAS] or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [UAV]). By 2015, the maturity 
of RPVs has reached an unprecedented level; foreseeable military and civil 
applications are ranging from surveillance and environmental observations to 
agricultural operations and cargo transport. While RPVs offer several distinct 
advantages over manned aircraft, their mode of operation still presents unsolved 
challenges. Yet despite their maturity and potential, an integration of RPVs into 
the existing Air Transportation System (ATS) and Airspace Structure is pending 
(BBC, 2013 and FAA, n.d.).  
 
While the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has 
identified the need for technical solutions and a different regulatory framework 
for the safe integration into non-segregated airspace (ICAO, 2011), the goal of 
this study is to assess the risk of an integration of RPVs into the present state 
ATS on the basis of current regulations. It is argued that a Heron 1 type RPV 
may be safely integrated in European airspace within the existing airspace 
structure and governing rules, even without the availability of detect-and-avoid 
technology.  
The Heron 1 RPV System 
 
 The Heron 1 is a RPV, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) 
and is equipped with electro-optical sensors for day / night observation and a 
laser pointer (Multi-Mission Optronic Stabilized Platform, MOSP). Its crew 
consists of two operators: the Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) as Pilot in Command 
(PIC), who is either holds a Commercial Pilot Single Engine Land including 
Instrument Rating as a minimum or is a licensed military pilot, and the Payload 
Operator (PO). The highly sophisticated autopilot system performs full 
automatic takeoffs and landings. The Heron 1 operating system, however, 
consists of additional parts besides the aircraft, such as the Advanced Ground 
Control Station (AGCS), the Ground Data Terminal (GDT), and the Ground 
Satellite Terminal (GST).  
 
 The maximum takeoff mass of a Heron 1 is 1,150kg, including the 
maximum payload mass of 250kg. A Rotax 914 turbocharged piston engine 
with 115 horsepower (HP) powers the RPV, enabling it to climb to an 
operational altitude of up to 30,000 ft, while its  fuel capacity allows a maximum 
operational endurance time of 27 hours of flight time. The wingspan of the RPV 
measures 16,6 meters with a retractable landing gear. All control surfaces are 
redundant (two ailerons each wing, two rudders, and a split elevator). 
   
 Communication to and from the RPV is ensured via two redundant data 
links up to a line of sight (LOS) distance of 250 km between the GDT and the 
1
Ruff-Stahl et al.: Assessing the Risk of Integrating Large RPVs in Air Traffic
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2016
aircraft. In SATCOM configuration, this distance may be increased to beyond 
LOS. For navigation, the RPV system uses two Differential Global Positioning 
Systems (DGPS) for an Automatic Takeoff & Landing (ATOL) function and 
two conventional Global Positioning Systems (GPS) in combination with a two 
Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) for enroute navigation. In the case of GPS 
failure, a degraded navigation using INS or distance and bearing information by 
the GDT is possible. In case of link loss between the RPV and the AGCS, the 
RPV switches to a Return Home (RH) mode. In this mode, the RPV follows a 
pre-programmed route (RH-Route) back to the deployment base, followed by 
an automatic full stop landing.  
 
 The RPV is controlled by the AVO in the Advanced Ground Control 
Station (AGCS), containing two redundant control bays.  If one bay fails, the 
AVO and PO are able to immediately shift to a new control suite in the second 
bay. Should the entire AGCS fail, i.e. due to a fire or a loss of electrical power, 
which cannot be compensated by the emergency generator or batteries, RPV 
control may be transferred to another AGCS. 
 
 
Figure 1. Heron 1 RPV. Farsch, D. (Photographer). (20 March 2011). Heron 1 
[digital image]. 
   
 Control inputs from the AGCS are transmitted by fiber-optic cable to a 
trailer mounted Ground Data Terminal (GDT) and then sent to the RPV via data 
link, using a directional dish and omnidirectional antenna. The directional dish 
antenna is able to turn 360 degrees of azimuth and to adjust its declination in 
relation to the RPV’s position in space.  
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 For beyond LOS operations, a Ground Satellite Terminal (GST) is 
connected to the AGCS with a fiber optic cable. The GST transmits the control 
signals to a geostationary satellite, which in turn communicates via data link 
with the RPV.   
The Air Traffic Control System 
 According to a normal RPV flight profile, different airspace classes have 
to be crossed to accomplish its mission. For this study, a specific airspace 
around Schleswig AFB, Germany will be examined (fig. 3). 
 
         
Figure 2. Airspace near Schleswig, © DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH            
(2015). 
Takeoff and landing of the RPV will take place within Class D airspace. 
Inside class D airspaces all traffic is known to ATC, which assures separation 
(EU Commission, 2012). 
 
 Similarly, in the airspace above FL 100 (class C), all traffic is required 
to obtain an ATC clearance and separation is assured for IFR and VFR traffic 
by ATC. Figure 5 shows that there are two options for a RPV to reach class C 
airspace: either a circling climb in class C / D airspace above the airfield or a 
straight climb through class E airspace.   
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Figure 3. European Airspace Structure. © DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH 
(2015). 
 
Unless otherwise defined, no ATC clearance is required for VFR flights 
in class E airspace. IFR flights inside class E airspace are only separated from 
other IFR flights; separation to VFR traffic is based on the see and avoid 
principle.  
 
In the unique situation of Schleswig AFB, the gap between classes D 
and C airspace is closed by the adjacent restriced airspace (ED-R 148), 
established in this location to provide an effective protection against VFR 
flights (DFS, n. d.). Thus, under normal situations a RPV could take off from 
Schleswig AFB and gain altitude within class D and the restricted airspace until 
reaching class C airspace – without encountering any VFR traffic.  
Assumptions 
 Based on the RPV’s system components, the present ATS, and 
associated regulatory framework, the following eleven specific assumptions are 
made: 
1. It is assumed that all RPV-operators have valid licenses.  
2. The RPV is at least certified as an experimental aircraft in 
accordance with current EASA guidelines for aircraft 
certification.  
3. The data link to and from the RPV guarantees a safe and secure 
performance at all times, except in the respective failure 
scenarios.  
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4. Jamming or spoofing the communication link to and from the 
RPV is impossible.   
5. The European airspace enjoys uninterrupted radar coverage in 
the standard altitude bands, enabling a continuous, real time 
surveillance of the RPV while flying in that airspace.  
6. The RPV is capable of prolonged operations in all-weather 
situations during day- and nighttime. Safe operations are 
possible throughout the whole atmosphere band, including every 
possible altitude, temperature, and humidity. 
7. The navigational requirements for lateral and vertical separation 
are in correspondence with the EASA guidelines. Technical 
redundancy guarantees not only required backup systems, but 
also independent and sufficient energy resources.  
8. Exterior lighting and marking are in accordance with EASA 
regulations and help to visually identify the RPV over long 
distances.  
9. All commercial air transport aircraft, especially those operating 
in class C and D airspace are equipped with TCAS. 
10. The imagined converging vector for the Fault Tree Analyses 
(FTA)s will lead to a midair collision without intervention.  
11. For the taxation of likelihoods in terms of the FTA, the flight 
operation out of Schleswig AB, North Germany is assumed to 
consist of a maximum of 5 RPV flights per day. 
Methodology 
 For the purpose of this paper, logical and graphical representations of 
six different scenarios depict potential sequences of events cascading into an 
assumed, catastrophic top event, a mid-air collision between a RPV with a 
conventionally piloted aircraft (Ericson, 2005).  The method used to assess 
associated risk with this potential catastrophe is based on a modified Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), which are often used to quantify risk resulting from a potential 
sequence of events, leading up to a catastrophic incident (ICAO, n. d.). 
Moreover, an FTA “is easy to perform, easy to understand, provides useful 
system insight, and shows all of the possible causes for a problem under 
investigation” (Ericson, 2005, 183). 
 
From the top event downward, the lower order events will be assessed 
regarding their maximum allowable frequency, calculated by Boolean logic and 
an application of Bayesian Nets. The required probability ratios to complete 
these calculations have been determined by an expert group during two 
weekend workshops. 
 
The expert group consists of seven experienced aviators, all of which are 
professional pilots with military and / or civil flying background. Four experts 
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have considerable work experience as flight safety officers, while five group 
members are educated CRM trainers and human factors specialists within their 
military or civil organizations. Furthermore, one participant in the expert group 
enjoys over four years of experience as a civil RPV pilot.  
 
One limitation is, however, noteworthy: in order to examine all aspects of 
a possible midair collision between a manned aircraft and a RPV, an ATC 
controller would have been a desirable additional subject matter expert.  
 
According to Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), the desirable safety 
goal for air traffic within European ATS is a maximum allowable frequency of 
one event in 15,000 years for a single catastrophic event within its area of 
responsibility to ensure an overall safety goal of one catastrophic accident per 
30 years. Eurocontrol’s safety goal is based on the same values (DFS, 2004, p. 
1-52). From a base value of one event in 15000 years for a mid-air collision as 
the single event in question, top-down probability assessments are made to 
answer the question with what probability a lower order failure event would 
result in a higher order event, eventually leading up to the catastrophic mid-air 
collision. Out of the base value of one event in 15000 years and the probability 
assessments, the maximum allowable frequency of the bottom events or causes 
can be calculated. A more detailed description of the entire procedure will be 
provided in the next chapter.  
 
Results 
 
 The following six FTA assessments depict typical failure modes, which 
were determined by the expert group as realistic. In every scenario, out of a 
normal operations condition, a failure mode becomes evident. This initial 
failure mode then initiates a potential sequence of events, which would 
eventually result in a mid-air collision between the RPV and a conventionally 
piloted aircraft.  
 
 It is the goal of the following FTAs to calculate the frequency of this 
initial failure mode and compare it to the maximum allowable frequencies of 
occurrence within current regulations. As a result of this comparison, the risk 
level of of RPV integration in the current ATS may be determined and, 
ultimately, risk mitigation measures derived. 
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1. An aircraft violates minimum separation criteria to the RPV in 
airspace C, D, ED-R 
 
Figure 4. Violation of minimum separation criteria to RPV in controlled 
airspace 
Fault Tree. Out of normal air traffic operations on any given day, in this 
scenario an aircraft violates minimum separation criteria to the RPV (ICAO, 
Doc 4444 ATM/501, 2007). Reasons for the aircraft violating the airspace could 
be manifold, including ATC errors, navigational problems (e.g. pilot error, 
NAV database error, weather deviations), flight path deviation due to an inflight 
emergency (e.g. emergency decent) or other manifestations of human error, 
equipment failure, or environmental causes such as a weather deviation VFR 
traffic penetrating the airspace without clearance is included in this scenario. 
 
If the RPV and the other air traffic are not on a converging vector, a midair 
collision will not occur. Conversely, if both aircraft are on converging vectors, 
a midair collision would be the result – under the assumption that every other 
safety barrier fails. In the case of this and every following scenario, ATC would 
function as the next layer of defense. Should ATC deconflict in time, a midair 
collision will be avoided. If, however, ATC does not deconflict, the next safety 
layer will depend on the functionality of the Traffic Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS). For TCAS-equipped aircraft, there is a high likelihood that 
TCAS commands will prevent a collision with the RPV. For non-TCAS aircraft 
– or in the case of TCAS commands not being followed – the next safety barrier 
solely depends on a “see and avoid” maneuver by the pilot of the conflicting 
aircraft.  
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 Taxation of Likelihoods. The likelihood of each lower order event 
causing a higher order effect will be assessed in a top-down approach by the 
expert group conducting this study. In this scenario, the probability that a midair 
collision occurs after every barrier has failed is 100% – under the assumption 
that the aircraft pilot does not “see and avoid” the RPV at the last moment. It is 
further assumed that the visual identification technology available to the AVO 
is not being used for “see and avoid” purposes. In case that a pilot does not 
follow a TCAS advisory, the probability that the pilot will visually acquire the 
RPV and, thus, be able to avoid a collision at the last moment has been assessed 
as 50%. The probability, in turn, that TCAS will not advise a deconflicting flight 
path beforehand is judged as one percent (also assuming that not every aircraft 
in C, D, and ED-R airspace is TCAS equipped), whereas the probability that 
ATC does not correct a dangerous situation resulting from a converging flight 
path is taxed at 5%. The likelihood of a RPV and an aircraft initially being in 
the same airspace at the same time as a result of a systemic failure in air traffic 
is assessed as 1:100. 
 
 Risk. ESARR 4 (Safety Regulation Commission, 2001) introduces the 
following risk matrix for European ATC’s area of responsibility: 
Table 1 
  
Occurrence of the 
effect 
(Once per…) 
Severity of Effect 
Catastrophic Large Medium Low None 
< 1 hour a a a b d 
1 hour … 5 days a a b c d 
5 days … 18 
months 
a b c d d 
18 months … 150 
years 
b c d d d 
150 years … 15 
000 years 
c d d d d 
> 15 000 years d d d d D 
8
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol3/iss1/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2016.1103
Risks classified as “a” and “b” shall not be accepted. Risks classified as 
“c” are acceptable under certain conditions, such as a temporary acceptance. In 
any case, risk mitigation actions should be considered to lower these risks. Risks 
classified as “d” do not need further attention in the view of ESARR 4. 
 
 Similar to risk classification, the safety goals for the occurrence of the 
initial event will be calculated from the maximum occurrence rate times the 
probability of its effect, too. The resulting safety goal criticality will be 
determined according to the following table (DFS, 2004). 
 
Table 2 
  
Severity of Effect Maximum Occurrence Rate 
Catastrophic Once in 15 000 years 
Large  Once in 150 years 
Medium Once in 18 months 
Low Once in 5 days 
 
The overall safety goal for a midair collision between the RPV and an 
aircraft is once in 15 000 years. Considering that every safety barrier fails with 
certain probabilities from the start of the chain of events until a potential midair 
collision, the safety goal for an aircraft violating minimum separation criteria to 
a RPV in airspace C, D, and ED-R is of 40 times in 18 months. This number 
indicates the system’s resilience, indicating that the overall safety goal will not 
be jeopardized, even if an aircraft violates minimum separation criteria in 
airspace C, D, ED-R up to 40 times in 18 months. Overall, the criticality of this 
failure mode is medium. 
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2. RPV deviates from cleared route in C, D, ED-R airspace 
 
Figure 5. RPV deviates from clearance in controlled airspace 
 Fault Tree. This scenario describes the event of the RPV deviating from 
its intended and cleared route in C, D, ED-R airspace. It is assumed that besides 
technical failures, human factor issues will mainly cause these deviations. 
Operator errors may include unintended RPV flight modes, a (pre-) selection of 
incorrect navigation points, or the utilization of unfitting NAV databases.  
 Taxation of Likelihoods. Compared to the likelihood values of the 
previous scenario, this scenario differs only in one case. If the RPV deviates 
from cleared route in C, D, ED-R airspace, the probability to end up on a 
converging vector in relation to another aircraft is assessed at 1:20 due to the 
volume of air traffic surrounding the RPV in non-segregated airspace.  
 Risk. As a result of the differing probabilities in this scenario, the safety 
goal for this failure mode is reduced to 8 events in 18 months. Nevertheless, the 
overall criticality of a RPV deviating from its cleared route in C, D, or ED-R 
airspace remains medium.  
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3. RPV deviates from cleared route and one aircraft with no 
communication link to ATC in same airspace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. RPV deviates from clearance without communication link to ATC 
 Fault Tree. In this scenario, a RPV deviates from its cleared flight path, 
while another aircraft is in the same airspace, at the same time, without 
communication to ATC. The RPV’s deviation could result from technical 
reasons (e.g. lost data link, engine failure, and other catastrophic failures) or 
simply due to operator error. The conflicting aircraft could have encountered a 
lost comm situation due to technical malfunctions or due to operator error, (e.g. 
switching to a wrong frequency). This scenario describes a critical case, in 
which a RPV may act unpredictably or with impaired maneuverability, while 
ATC cannot provide the lost comm aircraft with avoidance vectors.  
 Taxation of Likelihoods. The risk assessment of this scenario deviates 
from the first case at the first two safety layers. First, the probability a RPV 
deviating from its cleared flight path and ending up on a converging vector with 
another aircraft suffering lost comm with ATC is assessed as one in 10 000. 
Second, if it does happen, nonetheless, the likelihood of ATC being unable to 
issue avoidance vectors will increase to 50%. This is mainly due to the reduced 
number of options left to ATC, which depend on the cause for the flight path 
deviation by the RPV. 
 Risk. Mainly due to the low probability of both failure modes occurring 
on a converging flight path, the safety system will theoretically tolerate 4 RPV 
deviations from a cleared route and an aircraft with no radio connection with 
ATC in the same airspace in 5 days. Hence, the overall criticality of this failure 
mode is low. 
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4. Loss of RPV surveillance feed to ATC 
 
Figure 7. Loss of RPV surveillance feed to ATC 
Fault Tree. Secondary Surveillance Radars (SSR) interrogate 
transponders of airborne platforms, thereby providing relevant information on 
the target’s transponder squawk and flight level.  Based on these parameters, 
ATC provides traffic deconfliction. In this scenario, ATC loses the RPV’s 
transponder signal due to a technical malfunction in the RPV system.  
Taxation of Likelihoods. In this scenario, the possibility that ATC will 
not revert to primary radar based tracking methods and therefore fail to 
deconflict a RPV on a converging vector toward another aircraft is judged to be 
one in three cases. Moreover, due to an absent transponder signal, the RPV will 
not trigger TCAS alerts of other aircraft on a converging vector, thus increasing 
the likelihood of a missed TCAS deconfliction to 100%.  
Risk. A lost transponder signal is a problematic case in aviation 
controlled by secondary radar, regardless of the affected aircraft being manned 
or unmanned. All probability assessments included, the system will tolerate 6 
lost transponder signals in 150 years to meet the overall safety goal of one 
midair collision in 15 000 years with a medium criticality. 
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5. Loss of surveillance feed to ATC plus Comm Loss between RPV 
operator and ATC 
 
 
Figure 7. Loss of RPV surveillance feed to ATC 
Fault Tree. In this scenario, ATC loses the RPV’s transponder signal, 
while simultaneously losing radio contact to the RPV controller.    
Taxation of Likelihoods. The expert group considers the simultaneous 
occurrence of this case and a resulting flight path conflict as extremely low, 
namely 1% only. However, in contrast to the previous case, the likelihood that 
ATC will not deconflict a RPV on a converging vector with another aircraft is 
increased significantly to 50% due to the reduced number of options still 
available to ATC.  
Risk. Again, the overall safety goal for this case is once in 15 000 years. 
Using the previously mentioned calculations, the safety goal is 4 events in 150 
years with medium criticality.   
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6. RPV deviates into E airspace 
 
Figure 8. RPV deviates into E airspace 
Fault Tree. In this scenario, the RPV enters airspace E unintentionally 
or due to an inflight emergency, possibly leading to separation conflicts with 
other controlled or uncontrolled air traffic. Possible causes include ATC errors, 
navigational errors by the RPV operator, RPV navigation equipment failures 
(e.g. navigation database error, navigation sensor failure, altitude sensor failure) 
or other technical problems (e.g. engine failure, stuck rudder). In case of a RH 
scenario, the RH route could also penetrate airspace E due to an initial false 
programming.  
Taxation of Likelihoods. The likelihood of a converging vector in this 
scenario is 1:50 – under the assumption that a comparably higher number of 
VFR and IFR traffic uses airspace E at the time of the event. Due to the fact that 
only a certain portion of these aircraft will be under ATC control, the likelihood 
of a missed deconfliction by ATC is considerably higher. Similarly, most VFR 
aircraft in this airspace will not be equipped with TCAS; hence the likelihood 
of a TCAS deconfliction is reduced to 5%. On the other hand, VFR pilots 
normally proceed according to the principle of “see and avoid”. Thus, it is 
assumed that the probability of a successful deconfliction by a converging pilot 
is 100%. 
Risk. To maintain the overall safety goal of 1 event in 15 000 years, the 
safety goal for RPV intruding airspace E, for one of the previously mentioned 
reasons, equals 5 events in 18 months. 
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Discussion 
 If an aircraft violates minimum separation criteria in airspace C, D, ED-
R, a higher level of safety could be achieved by issuing the RPV pilot with a 
Recognized Air Picture (RAP), displaying secondary radar returns in the 
vicinity of the RPV. By using a RAP, the probability of a RPV-operator induced 
deconfliction after ATC and TCAS have failed to do so, could be increased. In 
addition, equipping the RPV with TCAS, thus potentially advising a 
deconflicting flight path to the RPV-operator, would further decrease the overall 
risk.  
 
 If the RPV deviates from cleared route in C, D, ED-R airspace, a RAP-
equipped RPV-operator in combination with TCAS would similarly reduce the 
associated risks. That same risk mitigation technique would work in case that 
the RPV deviates from its cleared route and one aircraft with no communication 
link to ATC is in same airspace. Both readily available measures would provide 
an additional layer of safety. 
 
 In case that the ATC loses its surveillance feed from the RPV, a RAP 
would only then increase the overall level of safety, if an alternative means of 
determining the RPV’s exact location, altitude, and flight path by means of an 
alternate data link between the RPV and its ground station is available to the 
RPV-operator. If this is indeed the case, the RPV operator could provide flight 
path deconfliction if needed as an additional safety measure. However, further 
examination would be needed to determine the exact probabilities and 
frequencies of safety gain to justify the necessary investments in technology.  
 
 Similarly, if ATC loses its surveillance feed from the RPV plus the radio 
contact has been lost between the RPV-operator and ATC, a RAP would only 
then significantly increase the level of safety, if the RPV’s position can be 
tracked and displayed by alternative means. A more promising approach to 
mitigate risk in this case would be to strive for additional technical redundancy. 
A simple quick-dial telephone connection from ATC-controller to RPV-
operator could be one such means. In the remote case of a simultaneous radio 
communications to the RPV and transponder signal-loss, ATC-controllers and 
RPV-operators would be able to coordinate the RPV’s flight path and together 
decide on the best deconfliction strategies. 
 
 Finally, if a RPV deviates into E airspace, an autonomously initiated 
transponder setting of 7700 should be mandatory upon the recognition of a flight 
path deviation. In case of a transponder failure on the RPV’s side, intense 
communication between ATC and the RPV-operator is necessary to report the 
actual position and altitude of the RPV on ATC request. Similar to the other 
scenarios, a RAP-equipped RPV-operator would further reduce the risk of a 
midair collision. Equipping the RPV with TCAS potentially advising a 
deconflicting flight path to the RPV-operator, would further decrease the overall 
15
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risk of RPV integration into the ATS.  Restricting the RPV to night missions 
would eliminate the threat of encountering random VFR traffic, since at night, 
all VFR flights are must be in radio contact with ATC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to examine whether RPV integration into the existing 
ATS and within the current regulatory framework would be safe enough today 
– without the availability of commercial off-the-shelf sense and avoid 
technology. Yet, it was not the goal of this study to provide a legal argument for 
the legal air traffic integration of RPVs without this technology.  
  
Results indicate that even without any risk mitigation changes, the 
maximum risk level would not exceed a medium risk to overall flight safety. 
With an implementation of four simple risk reduction measures, a significant 
reduction of risk would be possible. These measures are: 
 
 Equip the RPV-operator with a real time recognized air picture, thus 
enabling the operator to gain and maintain situational awareness on 
the traffic situation in the vicinity of the RPV. 
 Equip the RPV with TCAS, thus providing one additional layer of 
safety for the purpose of preventing a mid-air collision with other 
TCAS equipped aircraft. 
 Install a quick-dial land line phone connection between the RPV-
operator and Air Traffic Control. This would provide an additional, 
effective, and RPV-exclusive means of communication in the event 
of radio communication failures between ATC and the RPV-
operator.  
 Start the integration of RPVs into the ATS at night. While the safety 
level of see and avoid may be reduced in darkness, the fact that all 
air traffic – even in airspace E must establish two-way radio contact 
to ATC at night, will actually reduce the overall risk of a mid-air 
collision between a RPV and a conventionally piloted aircraft in this 
type of airspace. 
In summary and in the view of the authors of this study, RPVs may be 
integrated into the current ATS with a tolerable risk to air traffic, if these four 
recommendations are followed. Yet it is impossible to calculate whether an 
implementation of these recommended risk reduction measures would actually 
result in a low risk in every one of the scenarios above. Thus, further practical 
simulation and local implementation studies are needed to, first, confirm the 
theoretical results of this study and second, to investigate whether these risk 
reduction measures have an actual impact on occurrence frequencies or on the 
probabilities of higher order events resulting from lower order occurrences. 
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Abbreviations 
 
A/C  Aircraft 
AGCS  Advanced Ground Control Station 
ATOL  Automatic Takeoff & Landing 
ATS  Air Traffic System 
AVO  Air Vehicle Operator 
DGPS  Differential Global Positioning System 
GAF  German Air Force 
GDT  Ground Data Terminal 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GST  Ground Satellite Terminal 
HP  Horsepower 
IAI  Israel Aerospace Industries 
INS  Inertial Navigation System 
IR  Infrared 
MALE  Medium Altitude Long Endurance 
MOSP  Multi-Mission Optronic Stabilized Platform 
PIC  Pilot in Command 
PO  Payload Operator 
RAP  Recognized Air Picture 
RH  Return Home 
RPV  Remotely Piloted Vehicle  
SA  Situational Awareness 
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